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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper tests for market integration in 55 wholesale rice markets in 
India using monthly data over the period January 1970 – December 1999.  
The technique of Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand (2001) is used to identify 
common factors across various markets. It is discovered that market 
integration is far from complete in India and a major reason for this is the 
excessive interference in rice markets by government agencies. As a result 
it is hard for scarcity conditions in isolated markets to be picked up by 
markets with abundance in supply.  A number of policy implications are 
also considered.  
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I. Introduction  
 
The level of integration of agricultural markets is a critical determinant of 
agricultural price policy in developing countries, particularly large ones.  If 
agricultural markets are not integrated, then any local food scarcity will tend to 
persist, as distant markets (with no scarcity) will not be able to respond to the price 
signals of such isolated markets (Dreze and Sen, 1995).  Lack of integration can 
often lead to localized food scarcity, even famines (Currey and Hugo, 1985). 
Testing for such integration is, therefore, central to determining the (geographical) 
level at which agricultural price policy should be targeted, at least in the short-run. 
If all agricultural markets were not integrated at the national level then a national 
agricultural price policy would not be suitable. It would be more appropriate to 
target a common price policy to a set of integrated markets. In the longer run it 
would be imperative to enhance market integration across the board in order to reap 
the advantages of a large market.  
 This paper conducts robust tests for market integration in 55 wholesale rice 
markets in India. The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II briefly reviews the 
literature.  Section III reviews the data and methodology. Section IV presents the 
results, section V reviews some restrictions on internal trade in India and section VI 
concludes. An appendix details of some results not discussed in section IV.  
 
II. A Brief Literature Review - Three generations of market integration studies 
Since testing for market integration is central to the design of an agricultural price 
policy in large developing countries and has been an area of abiding research 
interest.  This literature can be divided into three broad categories. Until recently 
two broad approaches had been used to investigate market integration: (i) that 
devised prior to the use of cointegration techniques (e.g. Goletti 1994, Ravallion 
1988, Dantwala 1993, and Currey and Hugo 1984); (ii) those using cointegration 
methods of the Engle-Granger variety (e.g. Dercon 1995, Jha et al. 1997) and those 
using Johansen maximum-likelihood techniques (e.g. Wilson 2003).  To the extent 
that agricultural prices tested are non-stationary the latter technique is more 
appropriate. However, recent work has pointed out some deficiencies even in the 
popular cointegration approach.  
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The Goletti-Ravallion tests conceive of two forms of market integration. 
One is between a “central” market and any other market. This involves estimation 
of (1). 
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n high frequency, e.g., monthly data,    
own lags and the lagged prices in other markets along 
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integration between any pair of 
markets i and j. This involves estimation of (2): 
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Results in market integration usually involve the following five tests:  
where Pit = price in ith central mark
Pkt = price in kth market at time t; 
Xit = vector of exogenous variables (i
time is the sole exogenous variable;  
εit = stochastic error term; 
α’s, β’s and c’s are parameters to be estimated. 
(1) states that condition on i being the central market, the price in the ith 
market is determined by its 
ogenous variables.  
The second notion of market integration generalizes the notion of the cent
market and, therefore, considers bilateral market 
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(i) Market Segmentation  
H : β = 0 for j = 0,1,2,3, …; i j0 ij ≠ . If this null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
then we have m arket from the jth market. arket segmentation for the ith m
(ii) Short-run market integration  
This tests whether a price change in the central market will be immediately 
passed on to the ith market.  If this is case then the central market and the ith market 
are integrated in the short run. This would be the case if  
H0: βij,0=1 is accepted. 
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(iii) Long-run market integration  
The test for the long-run integration of the ith and jth market is given by 
testing whether the following restriction holds.  
1
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If this is the case then he short-run process of price adjustment described by 
the model is consistent with and equilibrium in which a unit increase in central 
prices is passed on (exactly) fully to local prices. Acceptance of short-run market 
integration implies long-run integration but that the reverse is not necessarily true.  
 (iv) Weak Integration  
 The test statistic used in this case is  
H0: 0=+∑ si βα  for any t. If this null hypothesis is not rejected then the tth ∑
si
period price in the ith market is determined by the tth period price in the jth market. 
 (v) No arbitrage Possibilities 
ing any opportunity for arbitrage and are, hence, efficient in this sense 
of the t
logy.  Following from the work of Engle and Yoo (1987) the 
authors estimate  
H0:ci=0.  If this restriction is satisfied then it would follow that the markets 
are not provid
erm.  
In the Indian case while Jha et al. (1997) study market integration using 
monthly data for 44 centre for rice and 47 centres for wheat using the Engle-
Granger methodo
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ihood estimation 
chnique o identify mar
Wilson (2003) uses Johansen’s full information likel
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1 0
τ τ
τ
−−= Θ + Φ + Ψ∑ ∑= =
k l
s tt t s
p p x ,  1, 2, ... ,
s
∀ =t T  (4) 
ASARC Working Paper 2005/03 4 
The VAR has a general error correction mechanism 
(ECM):
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The empirical findings suggest greater market integration in the post 
reform phase. The paper also quantifies a short run equilibrating price elastic
which indicates the ability of individual markets to return to equilibrium
faced with short-term commodity price shocks.  
However, the work of Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand (2001) (henceforth 
GRH) argue that it is not sufficient for market integration to hold that (I(1)) prices 
in an n-market system be cointegrated. In particular, if there is a single common 
factor linking these markets then there should be n-1 cointegration vectors.  
However, this is insufficient to validate the bivariate approach. A coi
system can be written as a vector error correction model (VEC).  In a system with 
locations each equation of the VEC is likel
- 
ity, 
 when 
ntegrated 
n 
y to contain error correction terms and 
lags from numerous other locations in the market system. The standard approach 
ion of the VEC to have at most one error correction 
term and implied lag structures. In most cases this would be a gross 
id 
ick 
e 
t the set of locations share (for the same traded commodity) the same 
necessarily restricts each equat
misspecification of the model. The GRH model overcomes this problem.  Rash
(2004) has also used this methodology.     
 
III. Data and Methodology  
With this as background it would not be surprising to discover lack of market 
integration in agricultural markets in India. That the extant analysis does not p
this up is probably a result of the technology to ascertain such integration. 
 This paper follows GRH (2001) in using a two-dimensional — trade and 
information - notion of market integration.  For a market to be called integrated, w
require tha
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long run information. In other words, a set of n markets with I(1) prices there 
sh
ated. The vector error correction 
model within this set of cointegrated prices gives indications of short-run market 
nkages. 
 Consider an nx1non-stationary I(1) vector of log-prices at time t: 
it 
y a 
itory component (e.g. itfa P
1
~
). In the 
ng tun the Pit move together because they share the same stochastic trend .  GRH 
9
j
en as a 
ould be linked through a cointegrating vector. Those centres that are not part of 
this cointegrating set-up cannot be said to integr
li
]...,[  where P is the log-price at centre  i at time period t. Suppose that 
P
2,1 ttt PPP =
t can be decomposed into two components as follows:  
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where ft is an sx1 vector of s(s<n) common unit root factors and 
~
tP is an nx1 vector 
of stationary components. Every element in the vector 
~
tP can be explained b
linear combination of a smaller number of I(1) common factors fit (permanent 
component) plus an I(0) or trans ∑
=
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s
j
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(2001) argue that as shown by the Granger Representation Theorem (Engle and 
Granger (1 87)) the representation in (5) is guaranteed if an only if there are n-s 
cointegrating vectors among the elements of the vector Pt.  A ma or result of the 
Granger Representation Theorem is that a cointegrated system can be writt
Vector Error Correction (VEC) model 
 )6(... 122111 tptptttt PPPPP εµ +∆Γ++∆Γ+∆Γ+Π+=∆ +−−−−  
where Γ and Π are nxn matrices and Π has reduced rank n-s.  The matrix Π can
written as '
 be 
αβ=Π , where α is an nx(n-s) matrix of coefficients and β is an nx(
matrix of cointegrating vectors.  Using this expression for Π we get ΠP
n-s) 
 
 run information.  Searching for just one 
t-1= αβ’Pt-1 =
αZt-1. The error correction term is Zt-1 = β’Pt-1 and α is the matrix of adjustment 
coefficients.   The elements of the matrix β cancel the common unit roots in Pt,  and 
in the long run, link the movements of the elements of Pt.  Complete market 
integration in the sense of GRH (2001) requires that s=1 because they are searching 
for locations that share the same long
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common factor is equivalent to searching for n-1 cointegrating vectors. In this 
t of locations where a 
uce r consumed. Nor is the existence of cointegrating prices 
fficient to fin et.  It needs to be found through a multivariate search for 
ingle commo  the case of wholesale markets for rice in India we find 
s to be true f centres out of a total of 55 that we analyzed.  Table 
etails the set nalyzed. 
le 1: List o es for rice studied in this paper. 
l Number  State  
approach the economic market is not given a priori by the se
good is prod d and/o
su d the mark
a s n factor.  In
thi or some subsets 
1 d  of centres a
 
Tab f 55 centr
 
Seria Centre 
1 Nellore 
2 Kakinada, 
3 Vijayavada 
4 Nizamabad 
5 Bhimavaram 
6 Tadepalligudem 
7  Hyderabad 
Andhra Pradesh  
8 Gauhati,  
9 Tihu 
10 Hailkandi 
Assam  
11 Ranchi .  
12 Dumka 
13 Jamshedpur 
14 Arrah 
15 Patna 
16 Sasaram 
Bihar  
17 Rajkot  Gujarat  
18 Karnal 
19 Shimoga  
Haryana  
20 Bangalore  Karnataka  
21 Trivandrum  
22 Kozhikode 
Kerala  
23 Raipur  
24 Raigarh 
25 Jabalpur  
26 Jagdalpur 
27 Durg 
28 Indore  
Madhya Pradesh  
29 Nagpur  Maharashtra  
30 Imphal  Manipur  
31 Sambalpur  
32 Balasore 
33 Jeypore 
34 Cuttack 
Orissa  
35 Amritsar Punjab  
36 Kumbakonam .  
37 Madras 
38 Tirunelveli 
39 Chidambaram 
40 Tiruchirapalli 
Tamil Nadu  
41 Agartala  Tripura  
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42 Azamgarh.  
43 Kanpur 
44 Nowgarh 
45 Varanasi 
46 Lucknow 
47 Allahabad 
ttar Pradesh  U
48 Sainthia   
49 Bankura 
50 Contai 
51 Calcutta 
52 Cooch-behar 
53 Balurghat 
54 Siliguri 
West Bengal  
55  Delhi  Delhi  
 
We use wholesale prices on medium quality rice for these centres.  Monthly data from January 1970 to December 1999 (3
years, 360 data points) from the publication Agricultural Situation in India are used).
0 
 
ank 
 
nger two step 
proced  
e 
 
ting vectors 
using the trace test based on the likelihood statistic.  Since there are less than n-1 
                                                
1  
 
 
The modus operandi of the analysis involves searching for the largest number of 
locations that share n-1 cointegrating vectors in a multivariate VAR framework –
the reduced rank VAR proposed by Johansen (1988, 1991). This tests for the r
of Π and, concurrently, estimates the number of cointegrating vectors as well as the
vector error correction model.  Thus, in contrast to the Engle-Gra
ure, as used in Jha et al. (1997) and other contributions, this is a single step
procedure and, hence, more efficient.  Along with identifying the number of 
cointegrating relations and estimating them, this procedure also estimates the short-
run dynamics.  Further, the existence of n-1 cointegrating vectors means that the 
vectors can be normalized in such a way that there are conitegrating relations 
between any pair of centres. However, a bivariate analysis is not justified since the 
true relationship between the markets is still a multivariate one.  
In line with GRH(2001) we start with the full set of  55 markets over th
period January 1970 to December 1999 (monthly data). We conduct the ADF and
KPSS tests to confirm that the (natural logs) of these price series are all I(1).2  We 
begin with all the n centres and test whether we can find n-1 cointegra
 
1 Other sources of data for the analysis in this paper include (i) Agricultural Marketing in India, 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, GOI; (ii) Agricultural Prices in India, Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture, GOI; (iii) Area and Production of Principal Crops in India, Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture, GOI (iv) Economic Survey, GOI (various years); (v) Farm Harvest Prices of Principal 
Crops in India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, GOI; (vi) Five-Year Plan Documents, GOI and  
(vii) Union Budget, 2004-05, GOI. 
 
2 These results are not reported here to conserve space.  Monthly dummies are added.  
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cointeg
study.  However, this methodology provides a much more robust methodology for 
ions are 
t f1t be a 
 
second condition requires that in (5) the transitory component does not Granger-
rating vectors we conduct a search of the subsets of these centres for which 
this holds. This procedure is continued until we identify all the sets of centres for 
which this result holds.  As GRH (2001) indicate this sequential procedure is 
subject to some pre-testing problems and its econometric rationale needs further 
the test of market integration than extant techniques (Rashid, 2004).  
Finally we estimate the common factor, f1t for each of these subsets.  This is 
derived from the specification of the error correction model (6).  Two condit
needed to identify the common factor.  The first imposes the condition tha
linear combination of the vector of prices {P1t,…,Pnt} so that f1tis observable. The
tP
~
cause the permanent component Af1t in the long run. Thus any shock that affects the 
transitory component is not transmitted to the long-run forecast of Pt.  This 
condition implies that in the vector error correction model the only linear 
combination of  {P1t,…,Pnt}such that tP
~
does not have any long run effect on Pt is 
 )7('1 tot Pf α=  
where 0' =αα o . This orthogonality condition meant that the vector αo eliminates the 
on term Zt-1 = β’Pt-1 from the vector error correction model, guaranteeing 
 
 
rt, or 
 the market would be guaranteed.  
 Table 2 we report the largest set of common factors across various wholesale rice 
a, e.g centre ctor integr with 
cointegrating vect  th se se ma kets also tisfy thes  
c re no orted h Also ted is mention of bilateral market 
integration between any two ma .  
 
error correcti
no effect of the transitory component on the long run forecast of Pt.  Equation (7) can
be used to reveal the locations that contribute to the transmission of long run
information. This is important for the design of economic policy.  Price suppo
stabilization policies, for example, could be targeted at those locations that form f1t.  
The transmission of policy to the rest of
 
V. Results  
In
markets in Indi ., all s in Common fa 1 are ated 6 
ors across em. Sub ts of the r sa e
onditions but a t rep ere. omit  any 
rkets
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Table 2: Common factors across various Wholesa ce ma s in India 
 
Bangalore Nellore Kakinada Vijayvada Nizamabad Tadepalli Hyderabad 
ommon factor 1 0.55 0.05 0.002 0.151 0.07 0.07 0.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e 
galore, Vijaywada and so on. Common factors 
 
ctor 1 
nd 4 belong to states that are contiguous (Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in the 
 case of Common 
ctor 4). Common factor he o  one whe tres are separated by 
W rem  about Table 2 is the relative paucity of 
arket integration in rice markets.  
atistics for the results are noted in Table 3. Lag selection was 
 the kaike Inf  Criterion (AIC).  
 Statistics for various Common Factors  
le ri rket
C
Trivandrum Guahati Amritsar    
0.29 0.84 0.44    
Common factor 2 0.78 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.6 
Gauhati Tihu Haikandi     
Common Factor 3  0.99 0.008 0.05    
Kakinada Sambalpur Balasore Jeypore Cuttack  
Common factor 4 0.91 0.18 0.02 0.36 0.03  
Ranchi Dumka Arrah Patna Jamshedpur 
Common factor 5 0.49 0.51 0.42 0.42 0.37  
 
 
The size of any individual coefficient in any common factor in Table 2 indicates th
contribution of that centre to the long run price connecting the markets in the 
particular common factor. Thus in the first common factor Hyderabad, has the 
strongest influence followed by Ban
3 and 5 involve centres within the same state (Assam in the case of common factor
3 and Bihar in the case of common factor 5) whereas centres in Common fa
a
case of Common Factor 1 and Andhra Pradesh and Orissa in the
fa  2 is t nly re the cen
considerable distances.  hat is arkable
m
 Diagnostic st
done on the basis of minimizing  A ormation
 
Table 3: Diagnostic
Common Factor 1 
 AIC = -16.7265
Log likelihood =    3140.4 HQIC = -16.1329
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  5.95e-17 SBIC = -15.2337
 
Common Factor 2 
 AIC = -8.9063
Log likelihood =  1644.681 HQIC = -8.70843
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  2.11e-08 SBIC = -8.40871
 
Common Factor 3 
 AIC = -8.99795
Log likelihood =  1661.132 HQIC = -8.80008
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.92e-08 SBIC = -8.50037
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Common Factor 4 
ommon Factor 5 
AIC = -14.2942
tes that it t t ate the vector error correction 
e c mmon f tor, for instance, 
rrection term ifi
able 4: Significance of Vector Error Correction Terms  
s E sq i2 i2 
14 7 74 0
56 27 0
 75 15 0
_lvijayawa 18 0.057628 0.2482 112.2377 0
18 0.070069 0.1176 45.30648 0.0004
lli 0.0 116 0
d 81 344 0
ctor 2
quation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
14 0.041752 0.085 31.9676 0.004
i 14 89 078 4388 0
0. 0.000
ctor 3 
Parms -sq chi2 
1 0 0
_ltihu 14 0.041159 0.0747 27.76145 0.0153
 0.058766 0.0952 36.18289 0.001
 Factor 4 
Parms -sq >chi2 
da 1 0 0
lpur 1 0 0
1 0 0
_ljeypore 16 0.062275 0.3066 151.2031 0
D_lcuttack 16 0.046538 0.3258 165.2758 0
 
 AIC = -14.4932
Log likelihood =  2689.536 HQIC = -14.1147
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  2.14e-13 SBIC = -13.5413
 
C
 
Log likelihood =  2653.816 HQIC = -13.9157
1e-13 SBIC = -13.3423Det(Sigma_ml)  =  2.6
 
 
Table 4 indica  was importan o estim
models (separately) as systems. In th ase of the first co ac
all the error co s are sign cant.  
 
 
T
Common Factor 1 
Equation Parm  RMS  R- ch P>ch
D_lbangalore 18 0.0480 0.18 1 78.23
D_lnellore 18 0.0846 0.2365 105.31
D_lkakinada 18 0.0637 0.2543 115.96
D
D_lnizamabad 
D_ltadepa gu~m 18 6636 0.256 .9701
D_lhyderaba 18 0.148 4 0.4074 233.7
 
Common Fa  
E
D_ltrivandrum 
D_lgauhat  0.0656 0.2 90.2
D_lamritsar 14 056823 0.0976 37.18942 7
 
Common Fa
Equation RMSE R  chi2 P>
D_lgauhati 4 0.06497 .2251 99.90458
D
D_lhailkandi 14
 
Common
Equation RMSE R  chi2 P
D_lkakina 6 0.0641 .2423 109.3593
D_lsamba 6 0.050348 .2412 108.6867
D_lbalasore 6 0.063545 .3047 149.8612
D
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Common Factor 5 
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
D_lranchi 16 0.054861 0.2164 94.44115 0
D_ldumka 16 0.072145 0.3068 151.3524 0
D_larrah 16 0.065826 0.2762 130.5181 0
44 0
n tor  cor s and int ng 
rs are r rte ppen x. n Table 5 we denote results on the non-
etric tests fo ifican  of the cointegrating vectors.  
 5: Sig fica nte ting Vectors  
ommon Factor 1 Common Factor 4 
chi2 P>chi2  E i2 P>chi2 
1  _ 66 3 
1 0  _ 1 16 0 
1 0 _ 1 19 0 
ce4 1 242.0389 0  _ 1 8 0 
ce5 1 118.855 0 
ce6 1 96.69669 0 
 2 Common Factor 5 
ion Parms 2 Equation Parms chi2 P>chi2 
_ce1 1 291.9082 0
ce2 1 5.243591 0.022 _ce2 1 274.5403 0
  _ce3 1 115.6697 0
   _ce4 1 163.222 0
ce2 1 72.78132 0
 
The results discussed above pertain to integration when more than two centres are 
involved.  In table 6 we report on absence of market integration on a bilateral basis 
in markets not included in the five integrating relations studied3 in Tables 2–5.  
 
                                                
D_lpatna 16 0.057465 0.2853 136.54
16 0.047774 0.2299 102D_ljamshedpur .1048 0
 
Results o  the vec  error rection term the normalized co egrati
vecto epo d in the A di  I
param r the sign ce
 
Table ni nce of Coi gra
C
Equation Parms quation Parms ch
_ce1 1 30.32 0 ce1 1 .8236 0 
_ce2 91.0163 ce2 1.4212 
_ce3 185.8059  ce3 3.6072 
_ ce4 5.60506 
_
_
 
Common Factor  
Equat chi2 P>chi  
_ce1 1 31.64788 0
_
 
 
Common Factor 3 
Equation Parms chi2 P>chi2 
_ce1 1 42.42805 0
_
 
 
3 Patterns of bilateral integration are not reported here to conserve space but are available from the 
corresponding author.  
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Table 6: Absence of market integration in markets not included in Table 2  
Centre State  Not bilaterally cointegrated with  
  Centres outside State  Centres within state  
Bhimavaram Andhra Pradesh  Agartala, Sainthia, Cooch-behar, Balurghat, Gauhati, Dumka, Nagpur, 
Imphal, Kumbakonam, Madras, Tirunelveli, Tiruchirapalli 
Tadepalligudem, 
Hyderabad 
Sasaram  Bihar  Nizamabad, Tihu, Hailkandi, Rajkot, Delhi, Karnal, Shimoga, 
Trivandrum, Kozhikode, Raigarh, Jabalpur, Jagdalpur, Indore, 
Sambalpur, Balasore, Cuttack, Amritsar, Madras, Agartala, 
Azamgarh., Nowgarh, Varanasi, Lucknow, Bankura 
Arrah, Ranchi, 
Jamshedpur 
Rajkot Gujarat  Tihu, Haikandi, Sasaram, Karnal, Trivandrum, Kozhikode, Jabalpur, 
Indore, Amritsar, Madras, Agartala, Calcutta  
 
Karnal  Haryana  Tihu, Haikandi, Jamshedpur, Sasaram, Rajkot, Kozhikode, Jabalpur, 
Durg, Indore, Amritsar, Madras, Agartala, Varanasi  
 
Shimoga Haryana  Tihu, Sasaram, Jabalpur, Indore, Amritsar, Madras,  Agartala   
Kozhikode Kerala  Tihu, Haikandi, Sasaram, Rajkot, Karnal, Trivandrum, Jabalpur, Durg, 
Indore, Amritsar, Madras,  Agartala,  Calcutta,  Siliguri  
 
Raipur Madhya Pradesh  Tadepalligudem, Hyderabad, Gauhati, Nagpur, Imphal, Tiruchirapalli, 
Sainthia, Cooch-behar  
 
Raigarh Madhya Pradesh Tihu, Haikandi, Sasaram, Trivandrum, Amritsar, Agartala, Varanasi, 
Allahabad, Calcutta, Lucknow   
Jabalpur, Indore  
Jabalpur  Madhya Pradesh Tihu, Haikandi, Ranchi, Jamshedpur, Arrah, Sasaram, Rajkot, Karnal, 
Shimoga, Bangalore, Trivandrum, Kozhikode, Nagpur, Sambalpur, 
Balasore, Cuttack, Amritsar, Madras, Agartala, Azamagarh, Nowgarh, 
Varanasi, Lucknow, Bankura, Contai, Calcutta, Siliguri, Delhi  
Raigarh, Jagdalpur, 
Durg, Indore   
Jagdalpur Madhya Pradesh Tihu, Haikandi, Sasaram, Madras, Agartala, Calcutta,  Jabalpur,  
Durg Madhya Pradesh Tihu, Haikandi, Karnal, Trivandrum,  Kozhikode, Amritsar, Madras, 
Agartala, Calcutta,  
Jabalpur, Indore  
Indore  Madhya Pradesh Nizamabad, Tihu, Haikandi, Sasaram, Rajkot, Karnal, Shimoga, 
Trivandrum, Kozhikode, Cuttack, Amritsar, Madras, Agartala, 
Azamgarh, Varanasi, Bankura, Calcutta, Siliguri  
Raigarh, Jabalpur, 
Durg,  
Nagpur  Maharashtra  Kakinada, Bhimavaram, Tadepalligudam, Hyderabad, Gauhati, Tihu, 
Haikandi, Dumka, Trivandrum, Raipur, Jabalpur, Imphal, Jeypore, 
Kumbakonam, Madras, Tirunelvelili, Chidambaram, Tiruchirapalli, 
Agartala, Kanpur, Allahabad, Calcutta, Cooch-behar, Balurghat, 
Lucknow 
 
Imphal  Manipur  Kakinada, Bhimavaram, Tadepalligudam, Hyderabad,  Gauhati, 
Dumka, Raipur, Nagpur, Jeypore, Kumbakonam, Tirunelvelili, 
Chidambaram, Tiruchirapalli, Kanpur, Allahabad, Sainthia, Cooch-
behar, Balurghat  
 
Kumbakona
m 
Tamilnadu  Kakinada, Vijaywada, Bhimavaram, Tadepalligudam, Hyderabad, 
Gauhati, Dumka, Arrah, Patna, Nagpur, Imphal, Jeypore, Kanpur, 
Lucknow,  Allahabad,  Sainthia, Cooch-behar, Balurghat  
Tirunelvelili, 
Chidambaram, 
Tiruchirapalli, 
Madras  Tamilnadu  Nizamabad, Bhimavaram, Tihu, Haikandi, Ranchi, Jamshedpur, 
Arrah, Patna, Sasaram, Rajkot, Karnal, Shimoga, Bangalore,  
Trivandrum, Kozhikode, Jabalpur, Jagdalpur, Durg, Indore, Nagpur, 
Sambalpur, Balasore, Cuttack, Amritsar, Azamgarh, Kanpur, 
Nowgarh, Varanasi, Lucknow, Allahabad, Bankura, Contai, Calcutta, 
Siliguri, Delhi 
 
Tirunelveli  Tamilnadu  Kakinada, Vijaywada, Bhimavaram, Tadepalligudam, Hyderabad, 
Gauhati, Dumka, Arrah, Nagpur, Imphal, Sambalpur, Jeypore, 
Agartala, Kanpur, Sainthia, Cooch-behar, Balurghat  
Kumbakonam,  
Chidambara
m  
Tamilnadu Kakinada, Vijaywada, Bhimavaram, Tadepalligudam, Hyderabad, 
Gauhati, Dumka, Nagpur, Imphal, Jeypore, Kanpur, Sainthia, Cooch-
behar, Balurghat  
Kumbakonam, 
Tiuchirapalli  
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Tiruchirapalli  Tamilnadu Kakinada, Vijaywada, Bhimavaram, Tadepalligudam, Hyderabad, 
Gauhati, Dumka, Patna, Raipur, Nagpur, Imphal, Jeypore, Kanpur, 
Sainthia, Cooch-behar, Balurghat  
Kumbakonam, 
Chidambaram 
Agartala Tripura  Nizamabad,  Bhimavaram, Tihu, Haikandi, Ranchi, Jamshedpur,  
Arrah, Agartala, Sasaram, Rajkot, Karnal, Shimoga, Bangalore, 
Trivandrum, Kozhikode, Raigarh, Jabalpur, Jagdalpur, Durg, Indore, 
Nagpur, Sambalpur, Balasore, Cuttack, Amritsar, Tirunelveli, 
Azamgarh, Kanpur, Nowgarh, Varanasi, Lucknow, Allahabad, Contai, 
Siliguri, Delhi  
 
Azamgarh.  Uttar Pradesh  Tihu, Haikandi, Sasaram, Trivandrum, Jabalpur, Indore, Amritsar, 
Madras, Agartala, Calcutta  
 
Kanpur Uttar Pradesh Tadepalligudam, Gauhati, Tihu, Nagpur, Imphal, Kumbakonam, 
Madras, Tirunelveli, Chidambaram, Tiruchirapalli, Agartala  
  
Nowgarh Uttar Pradesh Sasaram, Jabalpur, Amritsar, Madras, Agartala   
Varanasi Uttar Pradesh Tihu, Haikandi, Sasaram, Karnal, Trivandrum, Raigarh, Jabalpur, 
Indore, Amritsar, Madras, Agartala, Calcutta  
 
Lucknow Uttar Pradesh Tihu, Haikandi, Sasaram, Jabalpur, Kumbakonam, Madras, Agartala, 
Calcutta, Tihu, Haikandi, Trivandrum, Raigarh, Nagpur  
 
Allahabad Uttar Pradesh Tihu, Haikandi, Trivandrum, Raigarh, Nagpur, Imphal, Kumbakonam, 
Madras, Agartala, Calcutta  
 
Sainthia   West Bengal  Bhimavaram, Tadepalligudam, Hyderabad, Gauhati, Dumka, Raipur, 
Imphal, Jeypore, Kumbakonam, Tirunelveli, Chidambaram, 
Tiruchirapalli  
Cooch-behar, 
Balurghat  
Bankura West Bengal Sasaram, Jabalpur, Indore, Madras   
Contai West Bengal Tihu, Sasaram, Jabalpur, Madras. Agartala   
Calcutta West Bengal Haikandi, Jamshedpur, Sasaram, Rajkot, Kozhikode, Raigarh, 
Jabalpur, Jagdaplur, Durg, Indore, Nagpur, Cuttack, Madras, 
Azamgarh, Varanasi, Lucknow, Allahabad, Delhi 
 
Cooch-
behar 
West Bengal Kakinada, Bhimavaram, Tadepalligudem, Hyderabad, Gauhati, 
Dumka, Raipur, Nagpur, Imphal, Balasore, Jeypore, Kumbakonam, 
Tirunelveli, Chidambaram, Tiruchirapalli,  
Sainthia, Balurghat 
Balurghat West Bengal Bhimavaram, Tadepalligudam, Hyderabad, Gauhati, Dumka, Nagpur, 
Imphal, Jeypore, Kumbakonam, Tirunelveli, Chidambaram, 
Tiruchirapalli  
Sainthia, Cooch-behar 
Siliguri West Bengal Tihu, Haikandi, Sasaram, Trivandrum, Kozhikode, Jabalpur, Indore, 
Amritsar, Madras, Agartala  
 
Delhi   Tihu, Haikandi, Sasaram, Trivandrum, Jabalpur, Amritsar, Madras, 
Agartala, Calcutta  
 
 
Table 6 provides some indication of the reasons behind the relative lack of market 
integration in rice markets. A major centre like Madras, for example, is not 
integrated on a bilateral basis with as many as 35 centres outside the state in which 
it lies (Tamilnadu) but is integrated on a bilateral basis with all the centres within 
Tamilnadu. This broad qualitative result appears quite general. Any given centre in 
any state is more likely to be integrated on a bilateral basis with other centres within 
the state than with those outside it. This indicates that there are barriers to market 
integration across states. We discuss some aspects of this in the next section.  
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V. Restrictions on Internal trade 
 
The share of internal trade was 13.4 percent of GDP, in real terms, in 2001-02. The 
growth rate during the 1990s was 6.9 percent per annum. Despite this internal trade 
is amongst the most repressed sectors of the economy, even today.  There are 
controls and restrictions exercised by multiple authorities, at various levels. This 
results in serious barriers to trade at the inter-state and inter-district levels. There 
are differences in taxes and standards across the country. As a result of these 
restrictions and differentials the all-India market is fragmented. Traders are obliged 
to obtain licenses for trading and there are different authorities for issuing licenses 
for different goods. The process is highly time consuming, cumbersome, costly, 
variable and invariably corrupt. After obtaining a license the trader is faced with 
over 400 laws that govern trading. This plethora of restrictions and inherent 
differentials across the country prevent rational and uniform pricing strategies. The 
price differentials, in turn, do not reflect inherent market conditions and allow local 
scarcities to remain. The restrictions on trade prevent arbitrage possibilities, which 
could possibly help remove short-term price differentials. Some of the most 
important trade restrictive laws are: 
1. The Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 
2. Standard of Weights and Measures Act, 1976. 
3. Agricultural Produce Marketing Acts. 
4. Various Agricultural Commodity Control Orders. 
5. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1955. 
6. State Levy Control Orders. 
 The first Act controls production, storage, transport, distribution, use or 
consumption of a wide range of commodities. It authorizes the Central Government 
to issue Orders for  “increasing cultivation of foodgrains”, “controlling prices”, 
“regulating or prohibiting any commercial or financial transactions in food items” 
and “collecting any information”, amongst other things. The State Levy Orders 
make it compulsory for private rice mills to supply 7 to 75 percent of their 
production to the Food Corporation of India and the State Government, for the 
Public Distribution System. The important point with such Orders is that the price 
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received by the millers is ‘pan-territorial and pan-seasonal’. It is based on the 
Minimum Support Price for paddy plus average milling cost. Thus, for a major part 
of their output mills are not free to fix their price in accordance with economic 
considerations. 
 
 Government Food Supplies 
 Wheat and rice are the two principal foodgrains used by the Central 
Government for market price stabilization and for ensuring food security through 
the Public Distribution System. Rice is mainly procured for the Central Pool from a 
levy imposed on the rice millers/traders under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 
and the levy orders issued by the State Governments. The foodgrains stock 
maintained in the Central Pool by the Government is basically utilized for 
distribution to states for the PDS. The Food Corporation of India (FCI) has been the 
agent of the Government of India in the implementation of its grain policy. It was 
set up in 1964 “to undertake the purchase, storage, movement, transport, 
distribution and sale of food grain and other foodstuffs”. 
Earlier, grain procurement was largely confined to wheat and rice in the 
traditionally surplus states. This operation has now been extended to other states to 
provide price support to growers. Continuous availability of foodgrain is ensured 
through about 4.5 lakhs fair price shops spread throughout the country. A steady 
availability of foodgrains at fixed prices is assured which is lower than actual costs 
due to government policy of providing subsidy that absorbs a part of the economic 
cost (about 45%). The stocks are issued at highly subsidized to Below Poverty Line 
(BPL) families. There are a number of public schemes, like Antodaya Anna Yojana, 
Mid-Day-Meals Scheme, Sampoorna Gramin Rozgar Yojana, etc., under which 
food (rice and wheat) is supplied at highly subsidies rates or for free. Apart from 
these schemes a substantial part of the government supply goes to defence 
establishments. All these amount to a very serious direct intervention in the 
wholesale grain market, by the government. The Central government issues grain at 
the Central Issue Prices (CIP). This is then sold in the retail market by state 
government and other authorities at retail prices through the Public Distribution 
System (PDS) and other sources. As regards to the price fixation it is done on a very 
adhoc basis. Most importantly, there is no dynamism about the price fixation. For 
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instance, the government of India Economic Survey –1999 noted that the Central 
Issue Prices (CIP) for the PDS (Public Distribution System) had not been revised 
since 1st February, 1994 despite the year to year upward revisions effected in 
minimum support prices. CIP for PDS for wheat was Rs. 402 per quintal (Rs. 352 
per quintal for RPDS (Revamped Public Distribution System)) and for rice Rs. 537 
per quintal for the common variety, Rs.617 per quintal for fine and Rs. 648 per 
quintal for super fine quality respectively. For RPDS areas, CIP is Rs.50 per quintal 
less than the CIP for PDS areas. Constant CIP of rice and wheat has resulted in a 
higher food subsidy burden on the Government.  
The State Governments fix the 'retail end' prices for PDS and RPDS after 
taking into account the transportation cost and dealers’ commission, etc. Some 
States have fixed the ‘retail end’ prices for PDS and RPDS consumers even lower 
than the CIP. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, Tamilnadu and Orissa operate a 
scheme for rice at Rs. 2 per kg. and Government of Gujarat operates a scheme for 
wheat at Rs. 2 per kg. and the consequent additional subsidy is therefore borne by 
these States.  
In the years, when public stocks fall below the minimum buffer stock norms or 
when production shortfalls are anticipated, the Government takes recourse to 
imports for augmenting the buffer stocks. However, depending on the behaviour of 
the open market prices and the stock position in the Central Pool, the public stock 
of foodgrains is also utilized for market intervention as an instrument of supply 
management policy. This form of intervention is rather recent. It has been possible 
only due to the surplus grain situation. The grain markets in India suffer from a 
highly significant quantitative intervention due to all the schemes quoted above, as 
well as, a serious distortion in prices due to government pricing policy, which 
amounts to a non-pricing policy. Therefore, there are three factors originating in 
government policy and impinging upon the market: 
a. Quantitative interventions. 
b. Price distortions, at various levels — farm, wholesale and retail. 
c. Heavy subsidies. 
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The concern here is that if India continues to have good crops and if open sales 
pick-up then while these distortions persist, in the years to come, there would only 
be an unwarranted increase in these distortions. 
 It can be seen that the order of the government intervention is huge. We 
have taken the trends in total government supply, total market arrivals and arrived 
at the total supplies. Using these we arrive at the percentage share of the 
government in the wholesale markets for grain. The trends are from 1970 to 1995.4 
The trends, which can be seen in Figure 1 show a small rise in percentage of 
government supplies of rice over wheat in recent years. But this is reflective of the 
overall substitution of demand towards rice in the country. Table 7 and 8 further 
emphasize this point. Thus the impact of government in grain trade is massive and 
serious, both in quantitative terms as well as price terms. 
 
Figure 1  
Goverment Intervention in Wholesale Grain Trade
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4 The data is from All India Food Statistics, DES, Ministry of Agriculture, GOI. 
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Table 7:  Average Government Supply as a percentage of Total 
Supply of Wheat (1970-95)  
State   Percentage 
Andhra Pradesh 98.56468392 
Bihar 89.01432545 
Gujarat 59.57122853 
Haryana 19.54612708 
Madhya Pradesh 56.33779013 
Maharashtra 88.18409557 
Karnataka 93.8750001 
Punjab 10.33546167 
Rajasthan 51.80106295 
Uttar Pradesh 34.02207643 
India*  66.73544171 
* The India figure is obtained as a weighted average. 
Table 8:  Average Government Supply as a percentage of Total 
Supply of Rice During 1970-95 
Andhra Pradesh 37.10653573 
Bihar 27.33808512 
Gujarat 61.85753784 
Haryana 4.017281192 
Kerala 94.92623017 
Madhya Pradesh 59.51119554 
Maharashtra 86.47153477 
Karnataka 46.52830733 
Orissa 43.592039 
Punjab 0.254909453 
Tamil Nadu 34.52495823 
Uttar Pradesh 15.91028157 
West Bengal 65.14454229 
India  55.07647142 
 
Apart from the above restrictions there are serious fiscal and financial constraints. 
The main financial constraint operates due to very low organized banking sector 
credit (between 2-4 percent) being advanced to trade. The margin requirements, 
which are meant to control speculation and prices, set by Reserve Bank of India, 
prevent such lending. Since majority of traders are small and medium traders they 
do not have enough storage capacity. This, coupled with deficient credit 
availability, has the effect of preventing optimal inventory holdings, and ironically, 
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creates artificial shortages and higher prices. In addition as discussed above, the 
state plays a dominant role in wholesale grain trade and thus reduces the scope for 
efficient transmission of market signals.  
 Indian states have wide powers of taxation. Under the Indian constitution 
they can collect revenue on land and buildings, agricultural land and income, 
mineral rights, alcohol and narcotic substances (except tobacco), entry of goods into 
a local area for consumption or sale, electricity consumption or sale, sale of goods 
except newspapers but including works contracts and goods sold through hire 
purchase, motor vehicles, boats, transport of goods or passengers by road or inland 
waterways, and roads or inland waterway tolls, professions, luxuries, entertainment 
and gambling, stamp duties and registration fees on documents and court fees 
collected through judicial stamp duties.  Some important facts about these tax 
powers are: (i) interstate movement of goods are taxed, (ii) states do not have the 
right to tax services, (iii) state tax rates on different commodities do not have to be 
harmonized across states; (iv) the state sales tax structure co-exists with a central 
sales tax – the CENVAT - and with the central excise tax.  This amounts to an 
uncoordinated and inefficient tax structure. The state level VAT which was 
implemented on 1 April 2005 is designed to simplify this tax structure at the state 
end but is highly unsatisfactory at the present time.5   
                                                 
5 The basic structure of the VAT is as follows: (i) it has been imposed only on goods (since the states 
cannot yet tax services); (ii) A total of 550 items are slated to come under the purview of the VAT.  
However, there will be multiplicity of rates. There are two principal rates – of 4 percent on basic 
goods (with some basic goods and many unprocessed agricultural products being exempt) and 
capital goods and declared goods - with the rest of the goods being taxed at 12.5 percent.  While 
these state level taxes would be uniform across the country the central sales tax would continue to 
apply on interstate trade, although there is a proposal to phase out this tax. (iii) Exports as of now 
would be zero-rated whereas customs duties on imports would continue to be collected by the central 
government; like the sales tax now, the VAT chain would commence with the first sale post-import. 
(iv) States have been advised, but not required, to subsume other taxes such as entry taxes, the octroi 
and turnover taxes into the VAT. On the surface then this tax reform appears to represent a major 
simplification of the states’ tax structure that should provide a fillip to integrating India’s 
considerably fractured domestic market.  However, appearances can be deceptive as a number of 
problems with the VAT remain. First, the policy measure has simply ignored the problem of taxing 
inter-state sales. It recommends removing the central sales tax on interstate transactions but fails to 
lay down a road map for doing this. Complicating this is the fact that rules for deducting costs of 
inputs brought in from out of state have not been laid down. This will then create a bias for using 
inputs from within the state. Hence a major alleged advantage of the VAT structure – creating an 
integrated national market – might remain elusive.  The exclusion of services from the ambit of VAT 
is a serious omission.  With services constituting 52 percent of India’s GDP the distinction between 
goods and service inputs may often become blurred.  In fact the whole area of service taxation needs 
to be carefully considered and integrating it with a goods tax should have become the foundation of 
an efficient VAT as is the case in most developed countries which levy the VAT.   
The failure to bring imports into the VAT chain is a handicap as it means denial of set-off on 
customs duties paid on imports. This will create a cost bias in favour of industries using purely 
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VI. Conclusions  
 
This paper conducts robust tests for market integration in wholesale rice markets in 
India.  The results indicate absence of such integration across many subsets of these 
centres.  
 
This paper has identified the existing labyrinth of controls and government 
intervention in rice markets, however well intentioned, as counterproductive and 
responsible for such fragmentation of rice markets. Such fragmentation hurts 
efficiency of agricultural operations and isolates some markets stunting the 
functioning of market signals. Much has been written about state discretion and 
autonomy in some matters of economic policy in India. This is not the place to 
debate this point but it should be pointed out that this latitude should not extend to 
placing restrictions on internal trade.  Furthermore, this has nothing to do with 
decentralization of decision-making.  An economy such as the US, which is 
considerably more decentralized than India’s, still bans most, if not all, 
impediments to inter-state trade.   
 
Thus there is an urgent need to reform the rules governing interstate commerce in 
foodgrains and to overhaul the attendant state government tax policies and 
regulations.  There is an urgent need to reform price policy at the levels of producer, 
wholesaler and consumer.6 In addition, it is crucial to privatize wholesale grain in 
free trade and thus improve the efficiency of market signals.  These policy measures 
are long overdue.   
                                                                                                                                        
domestic inputs and, hence, act as a protectionist measure. The implications of this step have not yet 
been worked out.  Another drawback is that the government’s policy paper talks of input tax credit 
rather than of tax credit on purchases made in the course of production. This is an important 
distinction and lack of clarity on this issue may lead to much unnecessary litigation and, hence, raise 
transactions costs.  Other major reforms – outside the sales tax structure – need to be carried out as 
well. For instance, India’s stamp duties are among the highest in the world and lead to considerable 
under-valuation of property for sale purposes. This contributes significantly to the underground 
economy.  A reduction and harmonization of these rates across Indian states and integration with the 
VAT is long overdue.  Even this rather inefficient VAT structure has not been adopted throughout 
the country – five major states have opted out of it. 
6 For a review of this literature see Gulati and Rao (1992), Gulati and Sharma (1997), Gulati et al. 
(1996) and Persaud and Rosen (2003).  
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Appendix:  Results on Common Factors 
 
Table A.1 Vector Error Correction Models  
 
Common Factor 1  
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
D_lbangalore      
_ce1    L1 -0.22414 0.031678 -7.08 0 -0.28623 -0.16205 
_ce2    L1 -0.04808 0.019342 -2.49 0.013 -0.08599 -0.01017 
_ce3    L1 0.098699 0.032742 3.01 0.003 0.034526 0.162872 
_ce4    L1 0.068098 0.034276 1.99 0.047 0.000918 0.135279 
_ce5    L1 0.037454 0.021008 1.78 0.075 -0.00372 0.078629 
_ce6    L1 -0.02031 0.029446 -0.69 0.49 -0.07802 0.037408 
_SG_2 0.025843 0.012623 2.05 0.041 0.001103 0.050583 
_SG_3 0.012529 0.012792 0.98 0.327 -0.01254 0.0376 
_SG_4 -0.00105 0.012824 -0.08 0.935 -0.02619 0.024084 
_SG_5 0.008878 0.012839 0.69 0.489 -0.01629 0.034043 
_SG_6 0.006461 0.012899 0.5 0.616 -0.01882 0.031744 
_SG_7 0.0074 0.01278 0.58 0.563 -0.01765 0.032449 
_SG_8 0.010994 0.01275 0.86 0.389 -0.014 0.035984 
_SG_9 0.010869 0.012713 0.85 0.393 -0.01405 0.035786 
_SG_10 -0.00816 0.012685 -0.64 0.52 -0.03303 0.016698 
_SG_11 0.007091 0.012655 0.56 0.575 -0.01771 0.031894 
_SG_12 0.004245 0.012548 0.34 0.735 -0.02035 0.028838 
_cons -0.0087 0.009846 -0.88 0.377 -0.028 0.010596 
       
D_lnellore       
_ce1    L1 -0.02593 0.055853 -0.46 0.642 -0.1354 0.083541 
_ce2    L1 -0.21823 0.034104 -6.4 0 -0.28507 -0.15139 
_ce3    L1 0.138283 0.057729 2.4 0.017 0.025136 0.25143 
_ce4    L1 0.106757 0.060434 1.77 0.077 -0.01169 0.225206 
_ce5    L1 0.055175 0.03704 1.49 0.136 -0.01742 0.127772 
_ce6    L1 -0.03453 0.051918 -0.67 0.506 -0.13628 0.06723 
_SG_2 -0.0335 0.022256 -1.51 0.132 -0.07712 0.010118 
_SG_3 -0.07629 0.022554 -3.38 0.001 -0.1205 -0.03209 
_SG_4 -0.04408 0.022611 -1.95 0.051 -0.08839 0.00024 
_SG_5 -0.00755 0.022638 -0.33 0.739 -0.05192 0.03682 
_SG_6 0.009818 0.022743 0.43 0.666 -0.03476 0.054394 
_SG_7 -0.00357 0.022534 -0.16 0.874 -0.04773 0.0406 
_SG_8 0.00105 0.022481 0.05 0.963 -0.04301 0.045111 
_SG_9 -0.01731 0.022415 -0.77 0.44 -0.06125 0.026619 
_SG_10 0.00947 0.022366 0.42 0.672 -0.03437 0.053306 
_SG_11 0.00934 0.022312 0.42 0.676 -0.03439 0.05307 
_SG_12 -0.00145 0.022123 -0.07 0.948 -0.04481 0.041912 
_cons -0.00828 0.01736 -0.48 0.633 -0.0423 0.025746 
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D_lkakinada      
_ce1    L1 0.00146 0.042077 0.03 0.972 -0.08101 0.083929 
_ce2    L1 0.027966 0.025692 1.09 0.276 -0.02239 0.078321 
_ce3    L1 -0.3175 0.04349 -7.3 0 -0.40274 -0.23226 
_ce4    L1 0.110251 0.045528 2.42 0.015 0.021017 0.199484 
_ce5    L1 0.090642 0.027904 3.25 0.001 0.035951 0.145333 
_ce6    L1 0.02239 0.039112 0.57 0.567 -0.05427 0.099049 
_SG_2 0.032452 0.016766 1.94 0.053 -0.00041 0.065313 
_SG_3 0.044275 0.016991 2.61 0.009 0.010973 0.077576 
_SG_4 0.05519 0.017034 3.24 0.001 0.021804 0.088576 
_SG_5 0.084349 0.017054 4.95 0 0.050924 0.117775 
_SG_6 0.096162 0.017134 5.61 0 0.06258 0.129743 
_SG_7 0.074542 0.016976 4.39 0 0.041271 0.107814 
_SG_8 0.074656 0.016936 4.41 0 0.041463 0.107849 
_SG_9 0.060635 0.016886 3.59 0 0.027538 0.093731 
_SG_10 0.066563 0.016849 3.95 0 0.033539 0.099587 
_SG_11 0.041093 0.016809 2.44 0.014 0.008149 0.074038 
_SG_12 0.036225 0.016667 2.17 0.03 0.003559 0.06889 
_cons -0.02014 0.013078 -1.54 0.124 -0.04578 0.005491 
       
D_lvijayawa      
_ce1    L1 0.067723 0.038021 1.78 0.075 -0.0068 0.142243 
_ce2    L1 0.02451 0.023215 1.06 0.291 -0.02099 0.070012 
_ce3    L1 0.092063 0.039298 2.34 0.019 0.015041 0.169086 
_ce4    L1 -0.27501 0.04114 -6.68 0 -0.35564 -0.19437 
_ce5    L1 0.016889 0.025215 0.67 0.503 -0.03253 0.066308 
_ce6    L1 -0.00306 0.035342 -0.09 0.931 -0.07233 0.066213 
_SG_2 -0.01262 0.01515 -0.83 0.405 -0.04232 0.017072 
_SG_3 0.021008 0.015353 1.37 0.171 -0.00908 0.0511 
_SG_4 0.035566 0.015392 2.31 0.021 0.005398 0.065734 
_SG_5 0.038709 0.01541 2.51 0.012 0.008505 0.068912 
_SG_6 0.059149 0.015482 3.82 0 0.028805 0.089494 
_SG_7 0.058572 0.015339 3.82 0 0.028507 0.088636 
_SG_8 0.043515 0.015303 2.84 0.004 0.013521 0.073508 
_SG_9 0.033178 0.015259 2.17 0.03 0.003272 0.063085 
_SG_10 0.038362 0.015225 2.52 0.012 0.008522 0.068203 
_SG_11 0.04817 0.015189 3.17 0.002 0.018401 0.077939 
_SG_12 0.025365 0.01506 1.68 0.092 -0.00415 0.054882 
_cons -0.02352 0.011818 -1.99 0.047 -0.04668 -0.00035 
       
D_lnizamabad      
_ce1    L1 -0.03073 0.046229 -0.66 0.506 -0.12133 0.059882 
_ce2    L1 0.012599 0.028227 0.45 0.655 -0.04273 0.067923 
_ce3    L1 0.08164 0.047782 1.71 0.088 -0.01201 0.175291 
_ce4    L1 0.069156 0.050021 1.38 0.167 -0.02888 0.167195 
_ce5    L1 -0.14943 0.030658 -4.87 0 -0.20952 -0.08934 
_ce6    L1 -0.00195 0.042972 -0.05 0.964 -0.08617 0.082279 
_SG_2 0.02929 0.018421 1.59 0.112 -0.00681 0.065394 
_SG_3 0.021368 0.018668 1.14 0.252 -0.01522 0.057956 
_SG_4 0.029999 0.018715 1.6 0.109 -0.00668 0.066679 
_SG_5 0.021415 0.018737 1.14 0.253 -0.01531 0.058139 
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_SG_6 0.040529 0.018825 2.15 0.031 0.003634 0.077425 
_SG_7 0.027464 0.018651 1.47 0.141 -0.00909 0.06402 
_SG_8 0.017923 0.018607 0.96 0.335 -0.01855 0.054392 
_SG_9 0.020603 0.018553 1.11 0.267 -0.01576 0.056965 
_SG_10 0.002907 0.018512 0.16 0.875 -0.03338 0.039189 
_SG_11 -0.00607 0.018468 -0.33 0.742 -0.04227 0.030123 
_SG_12 -0.01265 0.018311 -0.69 0.49 -0.04854 0.023235 
_cons -0.02512 0.014369 -1.75 0.08 -0.05328 0.003046 
       
D_ltadepal~m      
_ce1    L1 -0.03279 0.043782 -0.75 0.454 -0.11861 0.053017 
_ce2    L1 -0.03309 0.026733 -1.24 0.216 -0.08548 0.01931 
_ce3    L1 0.021058 0.045253 0.47 0.642 -0.06764 0.109752 
_ce4    L1 0.131177 0.047374 2.77 0.006 0.038326 0.224027 
_ce5    L1 0.063005 0.029035 2.17 0.03 0.006097 0.119913 
_ce6    L1 -0.32083 0.040698 -7.88 0 -0.40059 -0.24106 
_SG_2 0.014485 0.017446 0.83 0.406 -0.01971 0.048678 
_SG_3 0.02099 0.01768 1.19 0.235 -0.01366 0.055642 
_SG_4 0.029589 0.017724 1.67 0.095 -0.00515 0.064328 
_SG_5 0.046783 0.017745 2.64 0.008 0.012003 0.081564 
_SG_6 0.067693 0.017828 3.8 0 0.032751 0.102636 
_SG_7 0.038117 0.017664 2.16 0.031 0.003497 0.072737 
_SG_8 0.051406 0.017622 2.92 0.004 0.016867 0.085945 
_SG_9 0.030329 0.017571 1.73 0.084 -0.00411 0.064767 
_SG_10 0.045408 0.017532 2.59 0.01 0.011046 0.07977 
_SG_11 0.016004 0.01749 0.92 0.36 -0.01828 0.050284 
_SG_12 0.008245 0.017342 0.48 0.634 -0.02574 0.042235 
_cons 0.000281 0.013608 0.02 0.984 -0.02639 0.026953 
       
D_lhyderabad      
_ce1    L1 0.327991 0.098183 3.34 0.001 0.135556 0.520425 
_ce2    L1 0.190871 0.059949 3.18 0.001 0.073372 0.308369 
_ce3    L1 0.045685 0.10148 0.45 0.653 -0.15321 0.244581 
_ce4    L1 0.268743 0.106236 2.53 0.011 0.060525 0.476961 
_ce5    L1 0.192248 0.065112 2.95 0.003 0.064632 0.319865 
_ce6    L1 0.010619 0.091265 0.12 0.907 -0.16826 0.189495 
_SG_2 0.023493 0.039122 0.6 0.548 -0.05319 0.100171 
_SG_3 0.050603 0.039647 1.28 0.202 -0.0271 0.128309 
_SG_4 0.056908 0.039747 1.43 0.152 -0.02099 0.134811 
_SG_5 0.124178 0.039794 3.12 0.002 0.046183 0.202173 
_SG_6 0.046369 0.03998 1.16 0.246 -0.03199 0.124729 
_SG_7 0.036028 0.039611 0.91 0.363 -0.04161 0.113664 
_SG_8 0.037457 0.039518 0.95 0.343 -0.04 0.11491 
_SG_9 -0.00317 0.039402 -0.08 0.936 -0.0804 0.074058 
_SG_10 -0.00802 0.039316 -0.2 0.838 -0.08507 0.069041 
_SG_11 0.01596 0.039222 0.41 0.684 -0.06091 0.092833 
_SG_12 0.003077 0.03889 0.08 0.937 -0.07315 0.079299 
_cons -0.00398 0.030517 -0.13 0.896 -0.06379 0.055832 
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Common Factor 2  
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
D_ltrivand~m      
_ce1     L1 -0.06594 0.021288 -3.1 0.002 -0.10766 -0.02421 
_ce2     L1 0.027998 0.025662 1.09 0.275 -0.0223 0.078295 
_SG_2 -0.00374 0.010894 -0.34 0.732 -0.02509 0.017615 
_SG_3 -0.01268 0.010902 -1.16 0.245 -0.03405 0.008684 
_SG_4 -0.01194 0.010894 -1.1 0.273 -0.03329 0.009413 
_SG_5 -0.01339 0.01089 -1.23 0.219 -0.03473 0.007955 
_SG_6 -0.01327 0.010892 -1.22 0.223 -0.03462 0.008076 
_SG_7 -0.00053 0.010903 -0.05 0.961 -0.0219 0.020838 
_SG_8 -0.01413 0.010905 -1.3 0.195 -0.03551 0.007241 
_SG_9 -0.01408 0.010915 -1.29 0.197 -0.03547 0.007313 
_SG_10 0.006697 0.010962 0.61 0.541 -0.01479 0.028182 
_SG_11 0.002009 0.010927 0.18 0.854 -0.01941 0.023426 
_SG_12 -0.01317 0.010894 -1.21 0.227 -0.03452 0.00818 
_cons 0.008533 0.007909 1.08 0.281 -0.00697 0.024034 
       
D_lgauhati      
_ce1     L1 0.171696 0.033493 5.13 0 0.106052 0.23734 
_ce2     L1 -0.3332 0.040374 -8.25 0 -0.41233 -0.25407 
_SG_2 -0.00229 0.017139 -0.13 0.894 -0.03589 0.031299 
_SG_3 0.01167 0.017153 0.68 0.496 -0.02195 0.045289 
_SG_4 0.024073 0.01714 1.4 0.16 -0.00952 0.057667 
_SG_5 -0.00651 0.017133 -0.38 0.704 -0.04009 0.02707 
_SG_6 0.038631 0.017137 2.25 0.024 0.005044 0.072218 
_SG_7 0.02285 0.017154 1.33 0.183 -0.01077 0.05647 
_SG_8 0.024799 0.017157 1.45 0.148 -0.00883 0.058426 
_SG_9 0.0332 0.017173 1.93 0.053 -0.00046 0.066859 
_SG_10 0.017517 0.017246 1.02 0.31 -0.01629 0.051319 
_SG_11 0.01045 0.017191 0.61 0.543 -0.02324 0.044144 
_SG_12 -0.0049 0.01714 -0.29 0.775 -0.0385 0.028689 
_cons 0.000664 0.012443 0.05 0.957 -0.02372 0.025052 
       
D_lamritsar      
_ce1     L1 -0.09574 0.028972 -3.3 0.001 -0.15252 -0.03895 
_ce2     L1 0.003797 0.034925 0.11 0.913 -0.06466 0.072249 
_SG_2 -0.00276 0.014826 -0.19 0.852 -0.03182 0.026297 
_SG_3 0.015963 0.014838 1.08 0.282 -0.01312 0.045044 
_SG_4 0.009069 0.014827 0.61 0.541 -0.01999 0.038129 
_SG_5 0.005135 0.014821 0.35 0.729 -0.02391 0.034183 
_SG_6 0.012207 0.014824 0.82 0.41 -0.01685 0.041262 
_SG_7 -0.00128 0.014839 -0.09 0.931 -0.03037 0.027798 
_SG_8 0.016268 0.014842 1.1 0.273 -0.01282 0.045357 
_SG_9 -0.00993 0.014856 -0.67 0.504 -0.03905 0.019184 
_SG_10 -0.0142 0.014919 -0.95 0.341 -0.04344 0.015043 
_SG_11 0.022947 0.014871 1.54 0.123 -0.0062 0.052093 
_SG_12 0.002965 0.014827 0.2 0.842 -0.02609 0.032025 
_cons -0.00469 0.010764 -0.44 0.663 -0.02578 0.01641 
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Common Factor 3  
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
D_lgauhati      
_ce1    L1 -0.36488 0.041546 -8.78 0 -0.44631 -0.28345 
_ce2     L1 0.004784 0.040693 0.12 0.906 -0.07497 0.08454 
_SG_2 -0.00397 0.016958 -0.23 0.815 -0.0372 0.02927 
_SG_3 0.009393 0.016981 0.55 0.58 -0.02389 0.042674 
_SG_4 0.020381 0.016969 1.2 0.23 -0.01288 0.053639 
_SG_5 -0.01057 0.016946 -0.62 0.533 -0.04378 0.022644 
_SG_6 0.033069 0.016976 1.95 0.051 -0.0002 0.066341 
_SG_7 0.017118 0.016945 1.01 0.312 -0.01609 0.050329 
_SG_8 0.020972 0.01695 1.24 0.216 -0.01225 0.054193 
_SG_9 0.028844 0.016967 1.7 0.089 -0.00441 0.062098 
_SG_10 0.010454 0.017004 0.61 0.539 -0.02287 0.04378 
_SG_11 0.006203 0.016969 0.37 0.715 -0.02706 0.039462 
_SG_12 -0.00471 0.016956 -0.28 0.781 -0.03794 0.02852 
_cons -0.0013 0.013112 -0.1 0.921 -0.027 0.024397 
       
D_ltihu       
_ce1    L1 0.003045 0.02632 0.12 0.908 -0.04854 0.054631 
_ce2    L1 -0.06423 0.025779 -2.49 0.013 -0.11475 -0.0137 
_SG_2 -0.0172 0.010743 -1.6 0.109 -0.03826 0.003852 
_SG_3 -0.01576 0.010757 -1.47 0.143 -0.03685 0.005319 
_SG_4 -0.02467 0.01075 -2.29 0.022 -0.04573 -0.0036 
_SG_5 -0.02181 0.010735 -2.03 0.042 -0.04285 -0.00077 
_SG_6 -0.01164 0.010754 -1.08 0.279 -0.03272 0.009435 
_SG_7 -0.02599 0.010734 -2.42 0.015 -0.04703 -0.00495 
_SG_8 -0.03186 0.010738 -2.97 0.003 -0.0529 -0.01081 
_SG_9 -0.02366 0.010748 -2.2 0.028 -0.04472 -0.00259 
_SG_10 -0.02059 0.010772 -1.91 0.056 -0.0417 0.000522 
_SG_11 -0.0299 0.01075 -2.78 0.005 -0.05097 -0.00883 
_SG_12 -0.01865 0.010741 -1.74 0.083 -0.0397 0.002407 
_cons 0.034029 0.008307 4.1 0 0.017749 0.050309 
       
D_lhailkandi      
_ce1     L1 -0.02989 0.037579 -0.8 0.426 -0.10354 0.043765 
_ce2     L1 0.113228 0.036807 3.08 0.002 0.041088 0.185368 
_SG_2 -0.02608 0.015339 -1.7 0.089 -0.05614 0.003982 
_SG_3 -0.01288 0.015359 -0.84 0.402 -0.04298 0.017223 
_SG_4 -0.02448 0.015348 -1.59 0.111 -0.05456 0.005607 
_SG_5 -0.02832 0.015328 -1.85 0.065 -0.05836 0.001722 
_SG_6 -0.02007 0.015355 -1.31 0.191 -0.05017 0.010024 
_SG_7 -0.0365 0.015327 -2.38 0.017 -0.06654 -0.00646 
_SG_8 -0.02013 0.015331 -1.31 0.189 -0.05018 0.009918 
_SG_9 -0.01356 0.015346 -0.88 0.377 -0.04364 0.016518 
_SG_10 -0.04118 0.01538 -2.68 0.007 -0.07132 -0.01103 
_SG_11 -0.04078 0.015349 -2.66 0.008 -0.07086 -0.0107 
_SG_12 -0.05236 0.015336 -3.41 0.001 -0.08242 -0.0223 
_cons 0.019357 0.01186 1.63 0.103 -0.00389 0.042602 
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Common Factor 4  
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
D_lkakinada      
_ce1    L1 -0.25025 0.035253 -7.1 0 -0.31935 -0.18116 
_ce2     L1 0.0328 0.050311 0.65 0.514 -0.06581 0.131407 
_ce3     L1 0.067902 0.040173 1.69 0.091 -0.01084 0.146639 
_ce4     L1 0.049132 0.038232 1.29 0.199 -0.0258 0.124065 
_SG_2 0.032861 0.017006 1.93 0.053 -0.00047 0.066193 
_SG_3 0.039352 0.017218 2.29 0.022 0.005605 0.073099 
_SG_4 0.045042 0.017206 2.62 0.009 0.011318 0.078766 
_SG_5 0.066554 0.017399 3.83 0 0.032452 0.100657 
_SG_6 0.074308 0.017455 4.26 0 0.040097 0.108519 
_SG_7 0.055277 0.017561 3.15 0.002 0.020858 0.089695 
_SG_8 0.054635 0.017431 3.13 0.002 0.020471 0.088799 
_SG_9 0.03647 0.017147 2.13 0.033 0.002863 0.070078 
_SG_10 0.044621 0.017095 2.61 0.009 0.011116 0.078126 
_SG_11 0.024127 0.017163 1.41 0.16 -0.00951 0.057766 
_SG_12 0.030929 0.01677 1.84 0.065 -0.00194 0.063797 
_cons -0.00702 0.014974 -0.47 0.639 -0.03637 0.022328 
       
D_lsambalpur      
       
_ce1    L1 0.053784 0.02769 1.94 0.052 -0.00049 0.108055 
_ce2     L1 -0.24499 0.039517 -6.2 0 -0.32245 -0.16754 
_ce3     L1 0.083807 0.031554 2.66 0.008 0.021962 0.145651 
_ce4     L1 0.035508 0.030029 1.18 0.237 -0.02335 0.094365 
_SG_2 0.028919 0.013358 2.16 0.03 0.002739 0.0551 
_SG_3 0.008581 0.013524 0.63 0.526 -0.01793 0.035087 
_SG_4 0.016751 0.013515 1.24 0.215 -0.00974 0.043239 
_SG_5 -0.02186 0.013666 -1.6 0.11 -0.04865 0.004925 
_SG_6 -0.01447 0.01371 -1.06 0.291 -0.04134 0.012405 
_SG_7 0.019379 0.013793 1.4 0.16 -0.00765 0.046413 
_SG_8 0.015521 0.013691 1.13 0.257 -0.01131 0.042355 
_SG_9 -0.02577 0.013468 -1.91 0.056 -0.05216 0.000632 
_SG_10 -0.04626 0.013427 -3.45 0.001 -0.07258 -0.01995 
_SG_11 -0.03419 0.013481 -2.54 0.011 -0.06061 -0.00777 
_SG_12 -0.02254 0.013172 -1.71 0.087 -0.04836 0.003272 
_cons -0.01095 0.011761 -0.93 0.352 -0.034 0.012098 
       
D_lbalasore      
       
_ce1     L1 0.006737 0.034948 0.19 0.847 -0.06176 0.075233 
_ce2     L1 0.028341 0.049875 0.57 0.57 -0.06941 0.126094 
_ce3     L1 -0.17036 0.039825 -4.28 0 -0.24842 -0.09231 
_ce4     L1 0.06834 0.0379 1.8 0.071 -0.00594 0.142624 
_SG_2 0.042418 0.016859 2.52 0.012 0.009375 0.075461 
_SG_3 0.057624 0.017069 3.38 0.001 0.02417 0.091078 
_SG_4 0.104354 0.017057 6.12 0 0.070923 0.137786 
_SG_5 0.083294 0.017249 4.83 0 0.049487 0.1171 
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_SG_6 0.063327 0.017303 3.66 0 0.029413 0.097241 
_SG_7 0.081455 0.017408 4.68 0 0.047335 0.115575 
_SG_8 0.073703 0.01728 4.27 0 0.039836 0.107571 
_SG_9 0.028743 0.016998 1.69 0.091 -0.00457 0.062059 
_SG_10 0.038835 0.016947 2.29 0.022 0.00562 0.072049 
_SG_11 -0.01473 0.017014 -0.87 0.387 -0.04808 0.018619 
_SG_12 0.001007 0.016624 0.06 0.952 -0.03158 0.03359 
_cons -0.01703 0.014844 -1.15 0.251 -0.04612 0.012065 
       
D_ljeypore      
       
_ce1    L1 0.101463 0.034249 2.96 0.003 0.034335 0.16859 
_ce2    L1 0.120424 0.048878 2.46 0.014 0.024625 0.216224 
_ce3    L1 -0.02006 0.039029 -0.51 0.607 -0.09656 0.056431 
_ce4    L1 -0.27029 0.037143 -7.28 0 -0.34309 -0.19749 
_SG_2 -0.0084 0.016522 -0.51 0.611 -0.04079 0.023979 
_SG_3 -0.00109 0.016728 -0.06 0.948 -0.03387 0.031699 
_SG_4 0.026772 0.016716 1.6 0.109 -0.00599 0.059536 
_SG_5 0.021491 0.016904 1.27 0.204 -0.01164 0.054622 
_SG_6 0.015503 0.016958 0.91 0.361 -0.01773 0.04874 
_SG_7 0.002772 0.017061 0.16 0.871 -0.03067 0.03621 
_SG_8 0.001465 0.016935 0.09 0.931 -0.03173 0.034656 
_SG_9 -0.01096 0.016659 -0.66 0.51 -0.04361 0.021688 
_SG_10 -0.03684 0.016608 -2.22 0.027 -0.06939 -0.00429 
_SG_11 -0.09219 0.016675 -5.53 0 -0.12487 -0.0595 
_SG_12 -0.05729 0.016292 -3.52 0 -0.08922 -0.02536 
_cons -0.00907 0.014547 -0.62 0.533 -0.03758 0.019446 
       
D_lcuttack      
       
_ce1    L1 0.012484 0.025595 0.49 0.626 -0.03768 0.062648 
_ce2    L1 0.08245 0.036527 2.26 0.024 0.01086 0.154041 
_ce3    L1 0.158395 0.029166 5.43 0 0.101231 0.21556 
_ce4    L1 0.05188 0.027757 1.87 0.062 -0.00252 0.106282 
_SG_2 -0.00071 0.012347 -0.06 0.954 -0.02491 0.023492 
_SG_3 0.019085 0.012501 1.53 0.127 -0.00542 0.043586 
_SG_4 0.02996 0.012492 2.4 0.016 0.005476 0.054444 
_SG_5 0.026506 0.012632 2.1 0.036 0.001747 0.051265 
_SG_6 0.003184 0.012673 0.25 0.802 -0.02165 0.028021 
_SG_7 0.017378 0.012749 1.36 0.173 -0.00761 0.042367 
_SG_8 0.043722 0.012655 3.45 0.001 0.018919 0.068526 
_SG_9 0.003415 0.012449 0.27 0.784 -0.02099 0.027814 
_SG_10 -0.02264 0.012411 -1.82 0.068 -0.04696 0.001687 
_SG_11 -0.00932 0.012461 -0.75 0.454 -0.03374 0.015102 
_SG_12 -0.02308 0.012175 -1.9 0.058 -0.04694 0.000783 
_cons -0.01066 0.010871 -0.98 0.327 -0.03197 0.010649 
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Common Factor 5 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
D_lranchi       
       
_ce1    L1 -0.2124 0.046083 -4.61 0 -0.30272 -0.12208 
_ce2    L1 0.063772 0.038538 1.65 0.098 -0.01176 0.139304 
_ce3    L1 0.09095 0.034615 2.63 0.009 0.023105 0.158795 
_ce4    L1 0.050018 0.042241 1.18 0.236 -0.03277 0.132809 
_SG_2 -0.00333 0.014357 -0.23 0.817 -0.03146 0.024814 
_SG_3 0.01059 0.014346 0.74 0.46 -0.01753 0.038707 
_SG_4 0.013441 0.014405 0.93 0.351 -0.01479 0.041675 
_SG_5 0.009293 0.014415 0.64 0.519 -0.01896 0.037546 
_SG_6 0.002001 0.014447 0.14 0.89 -0.02631 0.030315 
_SG_7 0.020837 0.014494 1.44 0.151 -0.00757 0.049245 
_SG_8 -0.0142 0.014534 -0.98 0.328 -0.04269 0.014283 
_SG_9 -0.03367 0.014425 -2.33 0.02 -0.06194 -0.0054 
_SG_10 -0.05031 0.014455 -3.48 0.001 -0.07864 -0.02198 
_SG_11 -0.06302 0.014462 -4.36 0 -0.09136 -0.03467 
_SG_12 -0.02961 0.014439 -2.05 0.04 -0.05791 -0.00131 
_cons 0.034871 0.01108 3.15 0.002 0.013156 0.056587 
       
D_ldumka       
       
_ce1    L1 0.224983 0.060603 3.71 0 0.106203 0.343762 
_ce2    L1 -0.51511 0.05068 -10.16 0 -0.61444 -0.41578 
_ce3    L1 0.000904 0.045521 0.02 0.984 -0.08832 0.090124 
_ce4    L1 0.15543 0.05555 2.8 0.005 0.046554 0.264306 
_SG_2 0.000361 0.01888 0.02 0.985 -0.03664 0.037366 
_SG_3 0.008259 0.018866 0.44 0.662 -0.02872 0.045236 
_SG_4 0.020984 0.018944 1.11 0.268 -0.01615 0.058114 
_SG_5 0.010344 0.018957 0.55 0.585 -0.02681 0.047499 
_SG_6 -0.02139 0.018998 -1.13 0.26 -0.05862 0.015848 
_SG_7 0.003031 0.019061 0.16 0.874 -0.03433 0.040389 
_SG_8 -0.00588 0.019113 -0.31 0.758 -0.04334 0.031581 
_SG_9 0.001418 0.01897 0.07 0.94 -0.03576 0.038597 
_SG_10 -0.03294 0.01901 -1.73 0.083 -0.0702 0.00432 
_SG_11 -0.05126 0.019019 -2.7 0.007 -0.08854 -0.01398 
_SG_12 -0.03111 0.018988 -1.64 0.101 -0.06832 0.006107 
_cons 0.004899 0.01457 0.34 0.737 -0.02366 0.033456 
       
D_larrah       
       
_ce1    L1 0.182944 0.055294 3.31 0.001 0.074569 0.291319 
_ce2    L1 -0.03542 0.04624 -0.77 0.444 -0.12605 0.055209 
_ce3    L1 -0.26108 0.041534 -6.29 0 -0.34249 -0.17968 
_ce4    L1 0.150618 0.050684 2.97 0.003 0.051278 0.249957 
_SG_2 -0.03796 0.017227 -2.2 0.028 -0.07172 -0.00419 
_SG_3 -0.02649 0.017213 -1.54 0.124 -0.06022 0.007252 
_SG_4 -0.03233 0.017285 -1.87 0.061 -0.0662 0.001552 
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_SG_5 -0.01263 0.017297 -0.73 0.465 -0.04653 0.021273 
_SG_6 -0.01502 0.017334 -0.87 0.386 -0.049 0.018952 
_SG_7 -0.0171 0.017391 -0.98 0.326 -0.05118 0.016991 
_SG_8 -0.05139 0.017439 -2.95 0.003 -0.08557 -0.01721 
_SG_9 -0.04958 0.017308 -2.86 0.004 -0.08351 -0.01566 
_SG_10 -0.0485 0.017345 -2.8 0.005 -0.0825 -0.01451 
_SG_11 -0.07674 0.017353 -4.42 0 -0.11075 -0.04273 
_SG_12 -0.1091 0.017325 -6.3 0 -0.14305 -0.07514 
_cons 0.016264 0.013294 1.22 0.221 -0.00979 0.04232 
       
D_lpatna       
       
_ce1    L1 0.187685 0.048271 3.89 0 0.093076 0.282295 
_ce2    L1 0.04508 0.040367 1.12 0.264 -0.03404 0.124198 
_ce3    L1 0.066197 0.036258 1.83 0.068 -0.00487 0.137262 
_ce4    L1 -0.34178 0.044247 -7.72 0 -0.4285 -0.25505 
_SG_2 -0.00959 0.015039 -0.64 0.524 -0.03906 0.019887 
_SG_3 -0.01908 0.015027 -1.27 0.204 -0.04853 0.010372 
_SG_4 0.001418 0.015089 0.09 0.925 -0.02816 0.030993 
_SG_5 -0.00034 0.0151 -0.02 0.982 -0.02993 0.029255 
_SG_6 0.000314 0.015132 0.02 0.983 -0.02934 0.029973 
_SG_7 0.028964 0.015182 1.91 0.056 -0.00079 0.058721 
_SG_8 -0.02017 0.015224 -1.33 0.185 -0.05001 0.009666 
_SG_9 -0.02599 0.01511 -1.72 0.085 -0.05561 0.003622 
_SG_10 -0.03465 0.015142 -2.29 0.022 -0.06433 -0.00498 
_SG_11 -0.03852 0.015149 -2.54 0.011 -0.06821 -0.00883 
_SG_12 -0.05696 0.015124 -3.77 0 -0.0866 -0.02732 
_cons 0.014759 0.011606 1.27 0.203 -0.00799 0.037505 
       
D_ljamshed~r      
       
_ce1    L1 0.165761 0.040131 4.13 0 0.087107 0.244415 
_ce2    L1 0.062379 0.03356 1.86 0.063 -0.0034 0.128154 
_ce3    L1 0.027672 0.030144 0.92 0.359 -0.03141 0.086753 
_ce4    L1 0.02636 0.036785 0.72 0.474 -0.04574 0.098456 
_SG_2 -0.00496 0.012502 -0.4 0.691 -0.02947 0.019542 
_SG_3 -0.00579 0.012493 -0.46 0.643 -0.03027 0.018697 
_SG_4 0.002482 0.012545 0.2 0.843 -0.02211 0.027069 
_SG_5 -0.00236 0.012553 -0.19 0.851 -0.02697 0.022242 
_SG_6 -0.00858 0.012581 -0.68 0.495 -0.03323 0.016081 
_SG_7 0.009418 0.012622 0.75 0.456 -0.01532 0.034156 
_SG_8 -0.00815 0.012656 -0.64 0.519 -0.03296 0.016653 
_SG_9 -0.02441 0.012561 -1.94 0.052 -0.04903 0.000209 
_SG_10 -0.0338 0.012588 -2.69 0.007 -0.05848 -0.00913 
_SG_11 -0.03423 0.012594 -2.72 0.007 -0.05892 -0.00955 
_SG_12 -0.02813 0.012574 -2.24 0.025 -0.05277 -0.00348 
_cons 0.003373 0.009648 0.35 0.727 -0.01554 0.022283 
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Table A.2  Normalized Cointegrating Vectors  
 
Common Factor 1  
 
Beta Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
_ce1       
lbangalore 1 . . . . . 
Lnellore (dropped)      
Lkakinada 4.16E-17 . . . . . 
Lvijayawa -2.78E-17 . . . . . 
lnizamabad 8.33E-17 . . . . . 
ltadepalli~m -2.78E-17 . . . . . 
lhyderabad -0.6417 0.056212 -11.42 0 -0.75187 -0.53153 
_trend -0.00309 0.000358 -8.63 0 -0.00379 -0.00239 
_cons -1.91145 . . . . . 
       
_ce2       
lbangalore (dropped)      
Lnellore 1 . . . . . 
Lkakinada -2.78E-17 . . . . . 
Lvijayawa (dropped)      
lnizamabad 2.78E-17 . . . . . 
ltadepalli~m -1.39E-17 . . . . . 
lhyderabad -0.90017 0.094355 -9.54 0 -1.0851 -0.71524 
_trend -0.00159 0.000601 -2.65 0.008 -0.00277 -0.00042 
_cons -0.55525 . . . . . 
       
_ce3       
lbangalore 2.78E-17 . . . . . 
Lnellore -1.39E-17 . . . . . 
Lkakinada 1 . . . . . 
Lvijayawa 5.55E-17 . . . . . 
lnizamabad -2.43E-17 . . . . . 
ltadepalli~m 2.60E-17 . . . . . 
lhyderabad -0.69827 0.051226 -13.63 0 -0.79867 -0.59787 
_trend -0.00205 0.000326 -6.3 0 -0.00269 -0.00141 
_cons -1.25407 . . . . . 
       
_ce4       
lbangalore 1.39E-17 . . . . . 
Lnellore -3.47E-17 . . . . . 
Lkakinada 2.26E-17 . . . . . 
Lvijayawa 1 . . . . . 
lnizamabad 2.08E-17 . . . . . 
ltadepalli~m 2.60E-17 . . . . . 
lhyderabad -0.71638 0.046047 -15.56 0 -0.80664 -0.62613 
_trend -0.00217 0.000293 -7.4 0 -0.00274 -0.0016 
_cons -1.1758 . . . . . 
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_ce5       
lbangalore -5.55E-17 . . . . . 
Lnellore -8.33E-17 . . . . . 
Lkakinada 6.25E-17 . . . . . 
Lvijayawa -5.55E-17 . . . . . 
lnizamabad 1 . . . . . 
ltadepalli~m -3.47E-17 . . . . . 
lhyderabad -0.94266 0.086466 -10.9 0 -1.11213 -0.77319 
_trend -0.00071 0.000551 -1.29 0.197 -0.00179 0.000369 
_cons -0.22112 . . . . . 
       
_ce6       
lbangalore -3.12E-17 . . . . . 
Lnellore 1.56E-17 . . . . . 
Lkakinada 6.51E-18 . . . . . 
Lvijayawa -2.34E-17 . . . . . 
lnizamabad -4.42E-17 . . . . . 
ltadepalli~m 1 . . . . . 
lhyderabad -0.56155 0.057106 -9.83 0 -0.67347 -0.44962 
_trend -0.00337 0.000364 -9.28 0 -0.00409 -0.00266 
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Common Factor 2  
 
beta Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
_ce1       
ltrivandrum 1 . . . . . 
lgauhati (dropped)      
lamritsar 0.964187 0.171391 5.63 0 0.628266 1.300109 
_trend -0.01476 0.001661 -8.89 0 -0.01802 -0.01151 
_cons -9.23144 . . . . . 
       
_ce2       
ltrivandrum (dropped)      
lgauhati 1 . . . . . 
lamritsar 0.28032 0.122416 2.29 0.022 0.040388 0.520251 
_trend -0.00924 0.001187 -7.79 0 -0.01157 -0.00692 
_cons -5.96442 . . . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
Common Factor 3  
 
beta Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
_ce1       
lgauhati 1 . . . . . 
ltihu (dropped)      
lhailkandi -0.24938 0.038286 -6.51 0 -0.32442 -0.17434 
_trend -0.00494 0.00026 -18.98 0 -0.00545 -0.00443 
_cons -3.46443 . . . . . 
       
_ce2       
lgauhati (dropped)      
ltihu 1 . . . . . 
lhailkandi -0.60799 0.071267 -8.53 0 -0.74767 -0.46831 
_trend -0.00171 0.000484 -3.52 0 -0.00266 -0.00076 
_cons -1.63442 . . . . . 
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Common Factor 4  
beta Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
_ce1       
lkakinada 1 . . . . . 
lsambalpur -6.94E-17 . . . . . 
lbalasore -5.55E-17 . . . . . 
ljeypore 5.55E-17 . . . . . 
lcuttack -0.79753 0.097563 -8.17 0 -0.98875 -0.60631 
_trend -0.00189 0.000549 -3.44 0.001 -0.00297 -0.00081 
_cons -0.66462 . . . . . 
       
_ce2       
lkakinada 2.78E-17 . . . . . 
lsambalpur 1 . . . . . 
lbalasore (dropped)      
ljeypore 5.55E-17 . . . . . 
lcuttack -0.86026 0.067709 -12.71 0 -0.99296 -0.72755 
_trend -0.00145 0.000381 -3.81 0 -0.0022 -0.00071 
_cons -0.57217 . . . . . 
       
_ce3       
lkakinada 5.55E-17 . . . . . 
lsambalpur -2.78E-17 . . . . . 
lbalasore 1 . . . . . 
ljeypore -5.55E-17 . . . . . 
lcuttack -0.94464 0.06789 -13.91 0 -1.0777 -0.81157 
_trend -0.00055 0.000382 -1.44 0.15 -0.0013 0.000199 
_cons -0.05158 . . . . . 
       
_ce4       
lkakinada -5.55E-17 . . . . . 
lsambalpur 2.78E-17 . . . . . 
lbalasore 1.11E-16 . . . . . 
ljeypore 1 . . . . . 
lcuttack -0.82956 0.08966 -9.25 0 -1.00529 -0.65383 
_trend -0.00139 0.000504 -2.76 0.006 -0.00238 -0.0004 
_cons -0.64711 . . . . . 
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Common Factor 5  
 
beta       Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]  
       
_ce1       
lranchi 1 . . . . . 
ldumka (dropped)      
larrah 5.55E-17 . . . . . 
lpatna 6.94E-17 . . . . . 
ljamshedpur -1.03427 0.060535 -17.09 0 -1.15291 -0.91562 
_trend -0.00013 0.000321 -0.4 0.687 -0.00076 0.0005 
_cons 0.313461 . . . . . 
       
_ce2       
lranchi 1.67E-16 . . . . . 
ldumka 1 . . . . . 
larrah (dropped)      
lpatna -6.94E-17 . . . . . 
ljamshedpur -0.89026 0.053729 -16.57 0 -0.99556 -0.78495 
_trend -0.00076 0.000285 -2.65 0.008 -0.00132 -0.0002 
_cons -0.48558 . . . . . 
       
_ce3       
lranchi 1.39E-17 . . . . . 
ldumka (dropped)      
larrah 1 . . . . . 
lpatna -2.78E-17 . . . . . 
ljamshedpur -1.00893 0.09381 -10.75 0 -1.19279 -0.82506 
_trend 1.38E-05 0.000498 0.03 0.978 -0.00096 0.000989 
_cons 0.098778 . . . . . 
       
_ce4       
lranchi 9.71E-17 . . . . . 
ldumka 2.78E-17 . . . . . 
larrah (dropped)      
lpatna 1 . . . . . 
ljamshedpur -0.91636 0.071726 -12.78 0 -1.05694 -0.77578 
_trend -0.00048 0.000381 -1.26 0.207 -0.00123 0.000266 
_cons -0.3834 . . . . . 
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